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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
PATRICIA MAUGHAN
JEPPSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
SAYLOR JEPPSON,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.
10452

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal concerns the custody and visitation privileges of the parties, with respect to their
children.
DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT
The trial court, pursuant to petition of the defendant, after hearing evidence and interviewing
the oldest child, modified the provisions of its prior
decree with respect to custody and visiting privileges of the parties.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant requests this court to affirm the modified Decree entered July 27, 1965, from which appeal was taken.
1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The chronology of events as set forth in tht·
Appellant's Brief, except as supplemented or modified in the argument, is accepted by the Respondent.
Because the two points raised by Appellant are
closely interrelated, both will be answered by Respondent in the same argument to avoid needless
repetition.
The record of the Court will be cited as R.,
the transcript of the hearing held June 29, 1965,
which is not separately numbered, will be cited T.
The transcript of the hearing held July 28, 1964
and August 4, 1964, will be cited T. 1964.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THERE HAD BEEN A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A MODIFICATION OF THE CHILD CUSTODY PORTION OF
THE DECREE, WHICH MODIFICATION IS IN THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN OF THE PARTIES.

Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, (1953),
provides:
"When a decree of divorce is made the
court may make such orders in relation to
the children, property and parties, and the
maintenance of the parties and children, as
may be equitable; provided, that if any of
the children have attained the age of 10 years
and are of sound mind, such children shall
have the privilege of selecting the parent to
which they will attach themselves. Such sub2

sequent changes or new orders may be made
by the court with respect to the disposal of
the children and the distribution of the property as shall be reasonable and proper."
This statutory provision is a clear mandate to
the trial court authorizing reasonable modifications
of decrees previously made concerning the custody
and visiting privileges with respect to the children
of the parties. The purpose is to do equity between
the parties and to protect the well-being of the minor
chilJren.
Both parties are required to make every reasonable effort to comply with an existing decree, and
a failure " ... to comply or to make a reasonable
effort to comply, is contempt, ... so long as the derree remains in effect." However, if there has been
a change of circumstances, the proper procedure is
a petition to modify the decree. Osmus v. Osmus,
198 P.2d 233, 114 Utah 216, ( 1948).
The appellant suggests that because the decree
which the defendant sought the court to review had
been in effect for a period of approximately nine
months, that the defendant's petition for modification must be viewed with suspicion. It is submitted,
however, that the petition was not only timely, but
necessary if defendant was to avoid being in contempt of court, because of Gary's refusal to spend
six weeks of his summer vacation in California,
~ts required by the Decree dated August 21, 1964.
He also had the greater responsibility of consider3

ing the welfare of the child. A petition was propel'!}
submitted to the court for the purpose of considei·ing the change of circumstances which had occurred
since the previous decree was entered. Gary, Uw
eldest of the three children of the parties, was 11
years old at the time of the hearing on June 29,
1965, was in the Fifth Grade and had indicated his
unwillingness to make the six weeks visit to the
plaintiff's home in California (T. 5, 6, R. 48) as
required in the Decree dated August 21, 1964 (R.
40, 41). His father, respondent here, had instructed him that he was required to make the visit (T.
5, 6). Gary indicated that if he was forced to make
the contemplated visit, that he would "run away"
( T. 6, R. 48) . He had hostile feelings toward Mr.
Allyn Schroeder, plaintiff's present husband ( T. 5,
65), and had become involved in a summer program
in Salt Lake City, in which he was much interested.
He was very active in the Cub Scout Program, was
playing on a Little League Baseball Team, and wished to join the family in a summer activity of swimming instruction (T. 4, R. 48). Additionally some
emotional antagonism existed between Gary and
the plaintiff and Gary maintained strong f~elings
about her ( T. 20). The court undoubtedly felt that
requiring Gary to spend six weeks of his summer
vacation in her home would intensify these feelings.
Plaintiff made no effort to see her son when she
made an unannounced trip to visit her parents in
Preston, Idaho, although she passed by Bountiful,
4

Utah, where Gary and defendant live. She did not
attempt to see Gary because she "thought it would
upset him" ('T. 47, 11).
Mr. Gene Kartchner, one of Gary's school teachers, who had become "quite well" acquainted with
him (T. 30), observed that Gary had emotional
problems and exhibited an antipathy toward girls
(T. 32). He was of the opinion that the contemplated visit to California would be an emotional experience for him (T. 33, 37).
This court has previously expressed the policy
of the courts in Utah in cases where the custody of
children is altered.
"While the parents are entitled to some
consideration, the paramount objective in such
proceedings is not therapy for them, nor vindication of asserted parental rights, but it is
the welfare of the children.
*

*

*

"Parental love must find expression, to
some extent at least, in sacrifice for the happiness and welfare of children, rather than in
merely insisting upon privileges of parenthood." Johnson v. Johnson, 7 Utah 2d 263,
265, 267, 323 P.2d 16 ( 1958).
Before readjusting the visiting periods of the
parents, full opportunity was accorded both to present evidence concerning the request of the natural
father to have temporary custody of his two childl'en in Utah for two weeks during their summer
vacation, and to restrict the length of the visit of
5

Gary in California. The August 24, 1964 Decree
had limited the father's opportunity to visit the two
younger children, ages 10 and 7, to the home of the
plaintiff in California. The court also conducted an
interview with Gary (T. 70).
Adjusting the rights of natural parents with
respect to their children, is a difficult responsibility
and the trial court has properly been accorded considerable discretion in making this judgment.
~'Due to the equitable nature of such proceedings, the proper adjudication of which is
highly dependent upon personal equations
which the trial court is in an advantaged position to appraise, he is allowed considerable
!attitude of discretion and his orders will not
be disturbed unless it appears there has been
a plain abuse thereof." Johnson v. Johnson,
7 U.2d 263, 267-268, 323 P.2d 16 ( 1958).
The court properly found there had been a substantial change in circumstances from the time of
the previous hearing in August of 1964, to the date
of the hearing at the end of the school year in 1965.
Certainly changes, beyond those minimum basic
changes cited in the Findings of Fact upon :which
the Decree of July 27, 1965 was based, existed, as
are shown in the Record.
Gary was now nearly 12 years old and he had
developed broader interests. He had completed the
5th grade and was doing well in school, with above
average performance, making primarily A's and
B's (T .. 3). He had become involved in the activi6

ties of the Cub Scout Program (T. 3). Further, he
had made the Little League Baseball Team and was
scheduled to play through the first week in August, 1965 (T. 3, 4). It is understandable that he
anticipated the possibility of playing in the All
Star Game ( T. 4). He was also planning to engage
in swimming instruction during much of the summer (T. 4). The activities in which he was engaged
were normal for a boy of his age. It was important
for him to engage in these activities with his friends
and to succeed in a program which he had begun.
When Gary was informed by his father that he was
to spend six weeks of his summer vacation in California, beginning the first of July, ''he began crying" and said he didn't want to go (T. 6).
During the summer of 1964, the defendant
took Gary to California to visit plainttiff and the
two younger children. Although not required to take
Gary, he did so because he thought he should visit
with his brother and sister ( T. 9) . Al though defendant took Gary to the plaintiff's home on four
separate occasions during the two days they were
there for the purpose of visiting her, she did not
see him once (T. 9, 10).
Initially Gary had lived with his mother and
step-father in California. Gary later told Mr. Schroeder in a telephone conversation initiated by Mr.
Schroeder, to ''leave him alone" and that he
''wouldn't go anywhere" with him (T. 65). With
this background it can be understood that Gary had
7

some justification for his feelings of disappointment
in being required to spend six weeks of his summer
vacation in a home where he would be unha11py.
Mrs. Schroeder indicated that she could arrange to
have Gary attend scout meetings in California (T.
48). However, to a boy of 12 years, the activity itself, without the association of his friends, loses
much incentive and purpose. Further, Mrs. Schroeder was of the opinion that if she had Gary for a
longer period during the summer that this would
"help his emotional feelings toward [her] and toward his step-father." (T. 48). Children are plainspoken and develop strong feelings. Their affections and loyalties cannot be transferred with thl
apparent ease of some adults. His antagonism toward Mr. Schroeder, had developed over a period of
time. He had seen his home broken and his mother
going out on dates with Mr. Schroeder while Mr.
Jeppson, his father had tried to put a stop to it
( T. 1964, 71, 72) . He had previously Iived with his
mother in her new home with his step-father.
1

A boy of tender years should not be required
to do a particularly distasteful thing, regardless
of the consequences to him, if its principal purpost>
is "therapy" for the parent.
The plaintiff's own attitude with respect to
the visiting privileges which had been established
by the court in August of 1964, is also indicative
of substantial change. In April, 1965, she with Mr.
Schroeder and the two younger children, made an
8

unannounced trip to visit her parents in Preston,
Idaho. vVhen defendant learned that Mrs. Schroeder
was in Preston, he talked to her at length on the telephone and requested, but was denied, the right to
speak to his two children ( T. 55) . A portion of that
testimony follows:
"Q

A

Q

A

Q
A

Q
A

Q
A

Q
A

Q

Do you feel he (Mr. Jeppson) should not
have the right to speak with these children or visit with them at this time, under
the supervision of the Court?
I don't know.
As a matter of fact, in this conversation,
this telephone conversation, he asked you
to let the children speak with him on the
telephone when you were up in Preston,
did he not?
This is true. He did.
And you ref used to let them come to the
phone and speak to him; isn't that right:
Yes. This was our vacation.
You have answered my question. You
refused to let them come to the phone
and speak with him, didn't you?
That's right. I did.
Yes. In fact, you gave the reason they
were out playing, didn't you?
That's right. They were.
Now, when you went to Preston, did you
go through Bountiful?
No.
How did you get to Preston?
9

A

Q
A
Q

A
Q

A

Q

A

Q

A
Q
A
Q

\Ve went through the freeway. This isn't
through Bountiful.
Well, that's near Bountiful, isn't it?
Well, you're as familiar with the road as
I am. But we did not go through Bountif ul.
Did you think it might be important to
Gary if you had stopped in Bountiful
and visit with him just a few minutes on
your way back to California?
No.
Did you think it might be important to
the other children for them to visit with
Gary for a few minutes in Bountiful, or
maybe an hour or so, on the way back?
I thought it was important if Gary could
come up there and visit.
Did Mr. Jeppson tell you, in the course
of the conversation, that you could come
down and visit with Gary if you wanted
to?
Yes. I believe that was mentioned, after
he told me that Gary had torn up my
letters.
And that's the reason he said he thought
you ought to come down and visit with
him, because of Gary's attitude towards
you; isn't that so?
No.
Has Mr. Jeppson ever asked you for your
telephone number in California so he
could call the children?
Yes, he has.
Have you given it to him?
10

A

Q

A
"Q
A

Q

A

Q
A

Q
A

Q

A

"Q

A

Q

A

No, I have not.
So that he could not even call them on
their birthday if he wanted to; is that
right?
I suppose. ( T. 55-57).

*

*

*

*

*

*

How did you come up here today, for
this trip?
By car.
By car?
that's right.
Mr. Schroeder drove?
This is true.
Did you bring the other children with
you?
Yes.
And would you have any objection to the
defendant visiting them while you are
here, under the supervision of the Court?
I would." (T. 58).
(By Mr. Rex J. Hanson) In other words,
do you think the father should have the
right to visit these children privately for
a few minutes while they're here?
If I were sure he wouldn't agitate and
upset them.
I didn't ask you that. I said, do you think
he should have the right to visit them
while they're here, without your being
there?
I wish to abide by the Court decree,
11

which states he can visit them in California. We don't ask any more from
Gary." (T. 58-59).
That portion of the August 1964 decree, limiting defendant's rights to visit the younger children,
Terry age 10 and Jed age 7, in California only,
constituted a severe restriction. When this, is coupled with the fact that Mrs. Schroeder refused to give
Mr. Jeppson her telephone number so that he might
visit with them occasionally on the telephone, and
that she had denied Mr. Jeppson the right to visit
with them personally or by telephone when in Utah,
is certainly a substantial change in circumstances
not contemplated by the earlier decree. As was observed in Johnson vs. Johnson, 7 U.2d 263, 265, 232
P.2d 216 ( 1958), the paramount objective in a child
custody proceeding is not "therapy for the parent nor
vindication of asserted parental right", but is the
welfare of the children. Certainly it is for the benefit of the children that they have reasonable contact
with their natural father, and if their mother insists on arbitrarily denying this right, such constitutes a substantial change in circumstances which
would itself justify the court's order modifying the
visiting privileges of the natural father. ,
A round trip of some 1400 miles was necessary
for defendant to visit his children in California and
plaintiff's suggestion that the defendant, having only
visited those children in California on two occasions between August 1964, and December 1964, is
12

imlication of any lack of concern or love for them.
AL the time of the hearing Terry was ten years old
and Je<l was seven years old. They were one year
older than when the Decree of August 1964 was
entered. This would also entitle the Court to reconside1· the limitation placed upon the defendant of
visiting the children only in California. Further,
the modified order permits the defendant to visit
the younger children at his home in Utah for two
weeks during the summer, and also provides for
the continuity of that visit as pertains to the children by requiring Gary to visit his mother in California for two weeks. This affords an opportunity
for all of the children to be together for one month
each summer. Such an arrangement is certainly in
the best interests of the children even though not
agreed to by Mrs. Schroeder. The fact that Mr.
Schroeder, the plaintiff's present husband, has business interests in Utah and makes three or four trips
per year is a new factor the court was entitled to
consider ( T. 60) .
uo

At the time the court entered its modified Decree on July 27, 1965, a further hearing was set
fo1· May 24, 1966. It was undoubtedly the court's
intention to review the matter for the purpose of
determining if the welfare of the children was being
best served. In view of the background of this case,
it is submitted that this was a proper reservation
(:f the equitable powers of the Court.
13

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence
adduced at the hearing was sufficient to support
the findings of the court that following entry of the
Decree on August 21, 1964, there had been a substantial change of circumstances sufficient to jus.
tify a modification in accordance with the provisions of the decree entered July 27, 1965, and that
the best interests of the children are served thereby.

Respectfully submittd,
HANSON & BALDWIN
Rex J. Hanson
Attorney for
Defendant and Respondent
909 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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